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Abstract
Strategies for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD) could become an important part of a new agreement for climate
change mitigation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change. We constructed a system dynamics model for a cocoa agrofor-
est landscape in southwestern Ghana to explore whether REDD payments are
likely to promote forest conservation and what socio-economic implications
would be. Scenarios were constructed for business as usual (cocoa production
at the expense of forest), for payments for avoided deforestation of old-growth
forest only and for payments for avoided deforestation of all forests, including
degraded forest. The results indicate that in the short term, REDD is likely to
be preferred by farmers when the policy focuses on payments that halt the
destruction of old-growth forests only. However, there is the risk that REDD
contracts may be abandoned in the short term. The likeliness of farmers to opt
for REDD is much lower when also avoiding deforestation of degraded forest
since this land is needed for the expansion of cocoa production. Given that it
is mainly the wealthier households that control the remaining forest outside
the reserves, REDD payments may increase community differentiation, with
negative consequences for REDD policies.
Introduction
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation (REDD) is considered as a possible means for
mitigating climate change (UNFCCC 2007). Payments for
decreased CO2 emissions from deforestation and degra-
dation is considered one possible mechanism, with pay-
ments based on the difference between realized emissions
and projected emissions from a historical emission base-
line (Kanninen et al. 2007; Righelato & Spracklen 2007).
A concerted effort of policies and payments for envi-
ronmental services can reduce deforestation (e.g., Pagi-
ola 2007). However, in many tropical landscapes gover-
nance is weak and funds for payments for environmental
services schemes are limited. In addition, in many trop-
ical landscapes commercial agriculture is the main agent
of deforestation (oil palm, cocoa, rubber, and soy) (Lam-
bin et al. 2001). Under these circumstances, can REDD
payments provide the incentives to halt deforestation?
We examined this question for southwestern Ghana, a
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region where forest has been and continues to be lost to
cocoa production. Ghana receives support for develop-
ing early REDD activities from the World Bank’s Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility. Using simulation modeling,
we examine whether REDD payments to farmers would
provide the necessary incentives for farmers to opt for
reducing deforestation and forest degradation instead of
cultivating their land. We also examine some of the socio-
economic implications of REDD, given that many policy
makers are driven by development issues rather than en-
vironmental issues.
Methods
The landscape
The Wasa Amenfi West district in southwestern Ghana
covers an area of 34,646 km2 of which 25% is natu-
ral forest. The district experienced heavy in-migration by
farmers growing cocoa, the most important cash crop, re-
sulting in a population of 156,260 inhabitants in 2000
(District Report 2005, unpublished). Forest reserves ac-
count for 12% of the total landscape and are largely
managed by private logging companies. A smaller part
of the reserves are Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas
(NRMP 1999), which are excluded from any extractive
use, just as the sacred forests outside the reserves. De-
forestation in the landscape has occurred mainly outside
forest reserves, driven by local farmers clearing for cocoa
production.
Participatory modeling
Participatory modeling consists of building a model to-
gether with actors from the landscape with the aim of ex-
ploring future landscape pathways. The aim of this spe-
cific model building exercise was to assess the current
state and dynamics of the Wasa Amenfi West landscape,
sketch expected future dynamics, compare REDD pay-
ments with the opportunity costs of cocoa production in
this setting and feed this into expert discussion. REDD’s
feasibility will depend strongly on local government and
landholders’ motivation to participate. Through participa-
tory scenario exploration these actors directly communi-
cate foreseen obstacles and likely preferences. To be built
in a participatory way, the model needed to compromise
on complexity to gain in continuous participant input and
validation. The simulation outcomes therefore are rough
indications rather than precise predictions, but they are
validated by expert opinion.
The model building was initiated in a workshop setting,
involving a district official from the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, cocoa farmers, a representative of a timber
company, personnel from local and international envi-
ronmental NGOs, and remote sensing and modeling ex-
perts. Data were obtained from a study on land cover
change (Fo¨rster 2009), district reports and the literature
(e.g., for carbon stocks). The model was produced using
the best available data, whenever data was lacking a me-
diated estimate was made by the local experts (Table 1).
The system dynamics model was built using the stock-
and-flow model software STELLA (HPS 1996). With its
icon-based interface, STELLA is readily understood by
participants without a modeling background (Sandker
et al. 2007, 2009; Van den Belt 2004). The model struc-
ture consisted of several submodels or “sectors” repre-
senting components of the social-ecological system such
as land-use change, population dynamics, carbon dynam-
ics, income, and REDD payments (Table 1).
In the model, deforestation is driven by growth in ru-
ral population and in line with forest conversion rates as
for the period 2000–2007. We modeled the conversion
of forest to cocoa plantations for large and small land-
holders. Some of the large landholders have old-growth
forest on their land, while smallholders have only access
to secondary forest. When available, 90% of the large
landholders’ demand for cocoa land will be taken from
old-growth forest; after depletion of the old-growth for-
est, the entire demand will shift to secondary forest. Lit-
tle off-farm employment exists in this remote rural part
of southwest Ghana. As a result, farmers all stated that
growing enough food for the family and making some
cash from cocoa were the two main farming goals (G.
Shepherd and S. Nyame 2009, personal observation). We
modeled all households to reserve at least one ha of land
for food crops.
Farmer income was modeled calculating the net in-
come from the cocoa plantations. The time to matura-
tion of cocoa is 8 years, followed by a 20 year production
period. In the first 2 years the cocoa saplings are inter-
cropped with food crops. Average values are used in the
model, e.g., for cocoa production per ha. Further assump-
tions and data inputs are provided in Table 1 and the full
model details are given in Appendix S1.
Farmer decision making was not modeled since there
was not enough information on how this occurs (see Wil-
son 2007 on the complexity of farmer decision making).
Rather, we explored what would happen to farmer in-
come and carbon stocks if farmers opted for or did not opt
for REDD. To compare the scenario’s attractiveness we
used the discounted value of per capita cash income over
20 years, referred to as net present value (Appendix S1),
though this is only one element of a very complex de-
cision making process. We also approximate after how
many years in the simulation the net present value of the
REDD scenario would drop below the net present value
of cocoa cultivation, indicating likely contract breaking,
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Figure 1 Total carbon stock in the off-reserve area for (a) area currently covered with old-growth forest under “business as usual” (scenario 1) and
“avoided deforestation of old-growth forest” (scenario 2); and (b) area now covered with secondary and old-growth forest under “business as usual” and
“avoided deforestation of standing secondary and old-growth forest” (scenario 3).
and at what carbon price this would not happen
(Appendix S1). In general, discount rates are high among
low-income farmers (Campbell et al. 2006). However,
Richards & Asare (1999) argue discount rates to be low
among Ghanaian cocoa farmers, since many see cocoa
farming as a type of old age pension, suggesting a dis-
count rate of 6%. We used discount rates of 6 and 20%.
Three scenarios were modeled. Scenario 1 explores
business as usual: old-growth and secondary forest are
converted into cocoa plantations extrapolating the lin-
ear trend for the period 2000–2007. Scenario 2 explores
avoided deforestation of old-growth forest. In this sce-
nario, we assume all large landholders with old-growth
forest on their land opt to receive REDD payments and
no old-growth forest is converted into cocoa plantations.
Scenario 3 explores avoided deforestation of all forest. In
this scenario, we assume all farmers with standing old-
growth and secondary forest on their land opt to receive
REDD payments and no forest is converted into cocoa
plantations. Only degraded cocoa plantations and non-
forested land is used for new cocoa plantations.
Payments are simulated only for forest outside reserves
since the forest reserves are already under a national
forest conservation strategy and are not available to lo-
cal farmers. We assume an international carbon price of
US$10/ton CO2 to be paid by investors (Table 1), of which
75% is lost to transaction costs (Table 1) and thus US$
2.5/ton CO2 would be received by the farmer reducing
emissions on his land. For the payments we assumed a 20
year payment contract, with a high up-front payment be-
cause of the start-up costs involved in REDD (Table 1).
Results
Land use changes and carbon
For scenario 1, carbon stock declines rapidly over 20 years
(Figure 1). These scenarios (Figure 1a and b) are used as
the baseline for the calculation of REDD payments. The
carbon stock on the land now covered with old-growth
forests outside reserves decreases by 37% from 3 to 1.9
million ton C (Figure 1a) and for old-growth and sec-
ondary forest together the carbon stock decreases by 40%
from 7.9 to 4.8 million ton C (Figure 1b). Already af-
ter 3 years, all old-growth forest outside the reserves is
converted into cocoa plantation, excluding sacred forests.
Once old-growth forest is gone, secondary forest cover
decreases faster as it gives way to new cocoa plantations.
The total cocoa area expands approximately 10% after 11
years to 220,000 ha after which there is no secondary for-
est or other land for further expansion. After 20 years the
food crop area per household has decreased by 10% due
to population growth and cocoa expansion.
Under scenario 2, the expansion of cocoa comes to an
end after 7 years, when cocoa has increased by 4% to
212,000 ha. At the start of the simulation the farmers
with old-growth forest shift their demand for new co-
coa land to secondary forest resulting in the depletion of
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Figure 2 Income per capita for the rural population in the district under
three scenarios: (1) business as usual, (2) no conversion of old-growth
forest, and (3) no conversion of standing secondary andold-growth forest.
secondary forest after 6 years. Under scenario 2, 1.2 mil-
lion ton C is prevented from being emitted compared to
business as usual (Figure 1a).
Under scenario 3, after 1 year, all nonforested fallow
land has been converted to cocoa plantations reaching
their maximum cover of 205,000 ha. The rest of the sim-
ulation the cocoa area decreases as old cocoa turns into
fallow land left unused for 3 years. The food crop area
per household drops by 15% after 20 years because of
the limitations placed on forest conversion. Some sec-
ondary forest regenerates into old-growth forest. Under
scenario 3 carbon in the off-reserve area currently cov-
ered by old-growth and secondary forest increases from
7.9 to 8.3 million ton C (Figure 1b) and 3.5 million ton C
is prevented from being emitted compared to business as
usual.
Rural income and opportunity costs
The average per capita income under scenario 1 decreases
from US$ 710 to 340 over 20 years for Wasa Amenfi
West’s rural population (Figure 2). This is partly due to
the decrease in cocoa price, dropping by 40% after 20
years following the World Bank’s forecast (Table 1). It is
also due to the shortage of land for new cocoa planta-
tions and declining soil fertility, while at the same time
land has to be shared among the expanding future gen-
eration. It is likely that migration out of the district will
increase in this situation, though this was not simulated.
Smallholders have no access to old-growth forest and
are therefore not receiving payments for halting defor-
estation. Under scenario 2, average annual REDD pay-
ments vary between US$ 18–180 per ha, while average
annual cocoa net income varies between US$ 388–563
per ha. For the first 7 years of the simulation large land-
holders have enough land without old-growth forest to
continue cocoa expansion at the current rate. Since co-
coa is simulated to become productive after 8 years, the
cocoa planting restrictions after year seven only impact
income after year 15 when it drops below income under
business as usual (Figure 2).
Under scenario 3, average annual REDD payments vary
between US$ 16–159 per ha, while average annual co-
coa net income varies between US$ 388–563 per ha.
Cocoa expansion is already restricted after 1 year, impact-
ing income after 9 years (Figure 2). However already af-
ter 2 years, average per capita income under scenario 3
drops below business as usual caused by the lack of food
crop land for smallholders. Smallholders are simulated to
shorten their cocoa cycle, converting older productive co-
coa to food crops, in order to maintain the minimum food
crop plot of one ha per household.
The opportunity costs of cocoa production are not met
by REDD payments. However, since REDD payments
would be received immediately while cocoa starts pro-
ducing after 8 years, discounting the income flows in-
creases REDD’s attractiveness. There is little to choose
between the scenarios in terms of net present value
(Table 2, first column), though scenario 3 appears to
provide the least incentives. Scenario 2 becomes slightly
more attractive to business as usual applying a high dis-
count rate; big future losses in income can be compen-
sated by a small up-front payment when discounting. The
low level of net present value variation among the sce-
narios is largely due to the fact that limiting cocoa ex-
pansion affects income with an 8-year delay, the time for
cocoa to start producing.
Alternative assumptions
Changing some assumptions on cocoa and carbon prices
in the model, result in the net present values given
in Table 2 (the alternative assumptions columns). The
outcomes appear sensitive to the discount rate applied,
though scenario preferences do not change with alter-
ing cocoa prices. When applying a 20% discount rate,
increasing the carbon price paid by investors from US$
10 to 15, net present values for scenario 1 and 3 are
about equal and doubling the carbon price, scenario 3
even gives a slightly higher net present value.
Contract breaking and the price of stopping
deforestation
If the farmers conserving their old-growth forest (sce-
nario 2) would merely aim at profit maximization they
would break the contract after year five and continue the
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Table 2 Net present values (US$) for 20 year income ﬂows under the three scenarios with current and alternative model assumptions applying a 6 and
20% discount rate
Net present value – 6% discount rate Net present value – 20% discount rate
Alternative assumptions Alternative assumptions
Cocoa price for
farmer ﬁxed at
US$1.46/kg
(price 2009)
Cocoa price
increasing
with 40% over
20 years
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$15
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$20
Cocoa price for
famer ﬁxed at
US$1.46/kg
(price 2009)
Cocoa price
increasing
with 40% over
20 years
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$15
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$20
Scenario 1 5,169 7,455 8,677 5,169 5,169 2,405 3,270 3,608 2,405 2,405
Scenario 2 5,170 7,437 8,641 5,186 5,202 2,419 3,283 3,619 2,428 2,437
Scenario 3 4,922 7,013 8,092 4,974 5,026 2,377 3,198 3,512 2,405 2,432
conversion to cocoa. This scenario results in some delay
in carbon emissions but not in net emission reduction or
conservation of old-growth forest over 20 years. To stop
the deforestation of old-growth forest, a carbon price of
at least US$ 55–60/ton CO2 is needed. Deforestation of
old-growth and degraded forest is stopped at a minimum
of US$ 70–75/ton CO2.
Discussion
Assuming an annual REDD payment, farmers are likely to
accept REDD initiatives, especially if a large up-front pay-
ment is planned as may occur with REDD funds pouring
into new initiatives (Angelsen 2008, p. 128). But soon
after the up-front payment is made, there may be a high
incentive to break the contract, given the higher financial
benefits from cocoa production. To keep avoiding defor-
estation after the contract period, payments should con-
tinue after 20 years increasing the price per ton CO2. If
cocoa prices remain at current values or increase, oppor-
tunity costs of cocoa will be even higher and therefore
carbon prices should be even more than US$ 55/ton CO2
to stop deforestation of old-growth forest. Price fluctua-
tions in tropical agricultural commodities are high (e.g.,
World Bank 2009a and b), providing a difficult context
for REDD which has to be based on long-term contracts.
If farmers opt for REDD this will likely widen the gap
between rich and poor given that 90% of the carbon is
stored in forest on large landholdings owned by <14%
of the rural population. Furthermore, poor people who
lease land may lose access to the land as large landholders
may claim back their leased-out land for REDD purposes.
The food crop area per capita decreases more under sce-
nario 3 than under business as usual, and they may opt
for cash cropping rather than growing enough food ex-
posing households to greater food insecurity. If REDD has
negative impacts on human wellbeing, and it increases
rural differentiation, then policy makers may not support
REDD, given their overriding concern with development
and not environmental issues. A potential source of con-
flict is the unclear tenure over carbon; agreements on ac-
cess to carbon payments and benefit sharing need to be
negotiated.
If REDD becomes an option it is likely that some land-
holders will opt for REDD and others wont, unlike our
scenarios where all do. There may be forest patches with
lower cocoa suitability and thus lower opportunity costs
where REDD is more attractive (e.g., on steep slopes).
However, in our simulation REDD payments are so far
from competing with opportunity costs of cocoa that even
low-productive areas may be preferred for cocoa than
REDD.
In landscapes comparable to this study, with little re-
maining unprotected old-growth forest, high population
pressure, and lucrative income from cash crop produc-
tion, REDD payments based on current carbon prices
would not outcompete agricultural production. REDD in-
vestments based on current carbon market conditions
made in such landscapes would most likely be received
with some enthusiasm, perhaps initially shift deforesta-
tion from old-growth to degraded forest, for the strategy
to be abandoned after some years. Such an investment
would not result in long-term reduction of carbon emis-
sions. That high prices for cash crops (including biofuels)
can undermine REDD strategies has also been shown in
Asia (Butler et al. 2009), while in some parts of Africa,
e.g., where shifting cultivation is practiced, REDD could
be a more lucrative option than current land uses (e.g.,
Bellassen & Gitz 2008).
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